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NOTES
Celebrities and the First Amendment:
Broader Protection Against the Unauthorized
Publication of Photographs
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between celebrities' and the media2 is generally symbiotic
in nature. Media accounts of the day-to-day activities of public personalities
make "great copy" and, thereby, produce large profits.3 Coverage by the
media, in turn, affords celebrities a kind of free advertising that can engender
public interest and further the individual's career. 4 The balance of this
mutually beneficial relationship, however, can be upset when the press, in
publishing certain material about a celebrity without his authorization, either
1. In this Note the term "celebrity" is used interchangeably with the term "public
personality" and denotes any "[c]elebrated or widely known person," WEBSTER'S TsmD NEw
INTErmATiONAL DIcTIoNARY 359 (1971), except one who is a public official. One of the primary
functions of the first amendment is to foster the process of democratic self-government. See
infra notes 114, 120-24 & 147 and accompanying text. This fundamental first amendment
principle suggests that different standards than those advocated here should apply to cases
involving the unauthorized publication of photographs of public officials. A discussion of
standards applicable to public officials is beyond the scope of this Note.
2. In this Note the term "media" is used interchangeably with the term "press" and refers
to any
medium of communication (as the newspapers, radio, motion pictures, television)
that is designed to reach the mass of the people and that tends to set the standards,
ideals, and aims of the masses.
WERSTER's THmD NEW INTERNATiONAL DICTIONARY 1389 (1971) (definition of "mass medium").
3. The National Enquirer, for example, publishers of a magazine devoted largely to stories
about celebrities, was the sixty-third largest media company as of 1982 with gross revenues of
140 million dollars. 100 Leading Media Companies, ADVERTISIG AGE, June 27, 1983, at M-
63.
4. Ashdown states:
Anytime a member of the news media chooses to make a presentation of a
particular event or performance, the publication or broadcast will customarily
take the form of free advertising and publicity. Such gratuitous exposure will not
only increase the immediate economic value of the act, but will also help to build
long term reputation, thus producing future economic benefits for the player or
performer.
Ashdown, Media Reporting and Privacy Claims-Decline in Constitutional Protection for the
Press, 66 Ky. L.J. 759, 792 (1977-1978). See Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the
Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1589 (1979) ("publicity, far from
being unwelcome to [professional performers], is their very livelihood").
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
invades the celebrity's privacy5 or appropriates something of value for which
he feels he should be compensated. 6 These concerns are frequently present
when a newspaper or magazine publishes a photograph of a celebrity without
obtaining the celebrity's consent. 7
When attempting to recover damages from the press for the unauthorized
publication of their photographs, celebrities frequently encounter the first
amendment' as an obstacle. The first amendment insulates the press from
liability when it publishes matters that are "newsworthy" or "of public
interest." 9 Broad judicial declarations that their activities are newsworthy
and of public interest'0 force celebrities, in effect, to contribute aspects of
their private and commercial lives to the public domain. This Note offers
a legal framework which, without compromising key first amendment values,
accommodates more fully the interests public personalities have in privacy
and in capitalizing economically on their fame.
This discussion first briefly outlines the history of the common law tort
of invasion of privacy" and then describes the applicability of the rights of
privacy and publicity 2 to suits brought by celebrities. The Note then dem-
onstrates why the principles underlying these two rights should be extended
5. See, e.g., Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 32-45).
6. See, e.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (suit by Cary Grant
seeking damages for unauthorized use of photograph in connection with magazine article dealing
with clothing styles).
7. Although this Note deals primarily with the publication of photographs, much of what
is said is also applicable to other methods of reproducing images, such as film or live broad-
casting.
8. The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom.. .of the press.. . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
9. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the issue, it is well settled
that the newsworthiness defense is required by the first amendment. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit recently stated that:
[tihe first amendment mandates a constitutional privilege applicable to those
torts of invasion of privacy that involve publicity .... This broad constitutional
privilege recognizes two closely related yet analytically distinct privileges. First is
the privilege to publish or broadcast facts, events, and information relating to
public figures. Second is the privilege to publish or broadcast news or other
matters of public interest.
Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980). See Spahn v. Julian Messner,
Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 221 N.E.2d 543, 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879 (1966) ("The factual
reporting of newsworthy persons and events is in the public interest and is protected.");
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 652D comment d (1977) (no actionable invasion of privacy
occurs when the subject-matter of the disclosure is of legitimate public concern); Woito &
McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Community
Decide Newsworthiness?, 64 IowA L. REv. 185, 186 (1979).
10. See Ann-Margret, 498 F. Supp. at 405 ("the fact that the plaintiff ... chose to perform
unclad in one of her films is a matter of great interest to many people"); see also infra notes
26-31 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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to provide celebrities with broader protection against the unauthorized pub-
lication of their photographs. The Note concludes by outlining three prevalent
theories of the first amendment and by demonstrating that two of these
theories would support the broader protection for celebrities advocated here.
I. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The concept of a legal right of privacy first gained prominence in 1890
in Samuel Warren's and Louis Brandeis's famous Harvard Law Review
article entitled The Right to Privacy." Responding to what they viewed as
the press's increasing affront to "the sacred precincts of private and domestic
life,"' 4 Warren and Brandeis argued for judicial recognition of a tort cause
of action for unwarranted publication of private matters. Although noting
that the right of privacy could not strictly be premised on traditional notions
of private property or copyright,"I the authors relied heavily upon these
concepts in attempting to establish that the right was, in effect, already
recognized by the common law.' 6
Since its conception by Warren and Brandeis, the notion of a legal right
of privacy has gradually gained acceptance in the common law and is now
recognized in most jurisdictions.' 7 Dean Prosser analyzed the privacy-related
cases and discerned four categories of privacy torts: (1) publicity which
places a person in a false light in the public eye; (2) intrusion upon a person's
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (3) public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about a person; and (4) appropriation, for com-
mercial purposes, of a person's name, likeness, or personality. 8 The Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts adopted Prosser's formulation. 9 Among these
four categories of privacy torts, all but the false light tort have possible
application in the context of the unauthorized publication of a non-mis-
leading photograph of a celebrity. 20
13. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
14. Id. at 195.
15. Id. at 200-05.
16. The authors posited that the common law right to intellectual and artistic property are
"but instances and applications of a general right to privacy." Id. at 198.
17. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 4, at 1581.
18. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALiF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SEcomN) oF TORTS § 652A (1977).
20. This Note focuses on cases involving the unauthorized publication of "truthful" or
"non-misleading" photographs and thus only briefly discusses the false light tort. One false
light case, Braun v. Flint, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984), is discussed below, see infra notes 88-
95 and accompanying text, to demonstrate a principle applicable to the unauthorized publication
of photographs generally.
The false light tort could be applicable to an unauthorized publication of a celebrity's
photograph if the publication gives "unreasonable and highly objectionable publicity that
attributes to him characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false," and thus places him before
1986]
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The Restatement's tort of intrusion upon seclusion, 2 in certain circum-
stances, could support a suit by a celebrity against a media defendant for
the unauthorized use of photographs. This form of the privacy tort com-
pensates the plaintiff primarily for the mental harm22 that occurs when
someone intentionally intrudes into a "private seclusion that the plaintiff
has thrown about his person or affairs. ' 23 The tort may be committed by
physical intrusion into a private place, in which case the tort is indistin-
guishable from trespass, or by intrusion through use of the senses, with or
without mechanical aids.u Courts and commentators typically take the po-
sition that the first amendment does not license the press "to trespass ...
or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's home or
office." ' 25 This general principle logically applies to celebrities' homes as well
as to the homes of private individuals. A celebrity, therefore, should be able
to recover damages for the unauthorized publication of his photograph
obtained through an intrusion upon a private place or seclusion.
Courts have refused to apply the Restatement's tort of public disclosure
of embarrassing private facts26 in the context of celebrity plaintiffs. The
the public in a false position. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment b (1977).
However, since the false light tort closely resembles defamation-the essence of both being the
falsity of the portrayal-many of the principles of defamation are carried over to false light
cases. See, e.g., Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d at 250 (5th Cir. 1984). It seems fairly clear, for
example, that the "actual malice" standard applicable in defamation cases involving "public
figures," Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1966), applies to false light suits brought
by celebrities, thus requiring the celebrity to prove the defendant had knowledge of or acted
in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374 (1967). The Supreme Court's restricted application of the "public figure" category in
defamation cases, see infra notes 130-41 and accompanying text, however, may suggest that
most celebrities would not have to prove "actual malice" in a false light case.
21. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS provides:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
22. Prosser states that the interest protected by the intrusion tort is primarily a mental one.
Prosser, supra note 18, at 392.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment c (1977).
24. Id. § 652B comment b.
25. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). See Emerson, The Right
of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329, 332 (1979); Miller,
The William 0. Douglas Lecture: Press v. Privacy, 16 GONZ. L. REv. 843, 850 (1981); Note,
Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
30 STAN. L. REv. 1185, 1191 n.20 (1978). But see Abrams, The Press, Privacy, and the
Constitution, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 67, who argues that the press
should not be liable when it trespasses or uses false pretenses to enter someone's home to
gather news if the intrusion "benefitted the public."
26. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that:
[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is sub-
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public disclosure tort has been called the "pure" or "true" privacy tort27
since, unlike the other three privacy torts, it is based wholly on the idea
that certain truthful facts about a person are not appropriate for publica-
tion.2 Since its inception, however, the public disclosure tort has been limited
by the "public interest" or "newsworthiness" defense whereby a media
defendant can defeat a privacy claim by showing that the published material
is of public interest. 29 Although the term "public interest" could refer to
two very different things-the public's "curiosity" or the public's "well-
being"-courts rarely make this distinction. Judges, in determining whether
certain published material is newsworthy and thus protected by the first
amendment, typically emphasize the public's curiosity in the material rather
than the public's need for it.30 Unable to define "news" and fearing that
the imposition of liability in even the most egregious instances of press
invasiveness might inhibit legitimate press activities, courts generally defer
to the press's determination of what is newsworthy.3' This deference has
precluded celebrities from recovering under the public disclosure tort.
The case of Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc.,32 illustrates the
extent to which celebrities have been precluded from recovering in cases
involving public disclosures. 33 In that case the defendants, publishers of a
magazine "which specializes in printing photographs of well-known women
caught in the most revealing situations and positions that the defendants are
able to obtain,"'34 published a photograph of actress Ann-Margret partly
naked. 35 The photograph was taken from a scene in the motion picture
Magic. 36 The plaintiff agreed to do the scene nude only on the condition
that few persons would be present during the filming and that no still
ject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legimate concern to the public.
RSATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 652D (1977).
27. Glasser, Resolving the Press-Privacy Conflict: Approaches to the Newsworthiness De-
fense, Com. & LAw, Spring 1982, at 23, 24.
28. The false light, intrusion, and appropriation torts are largely derivative of defamation,
trespass, and passing off or trademark infringement, respectively. Ellis, Damages and the Privacy
Tort: Sketching a "Legal Profile," 64 IowA L. REv. 1111 (1979).
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 711 (1940); Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 32-45); see also Woito & McNulty, supra note
9, at 196.
31. Glasser, supra note 27, at 24-25.
32. 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
33. Although the plaintiff's claim in Ann-Margret was based, in part, on New York's
privacy statute, see infra note 38, it is clear from the facts of the case that this part of her
claim was virtually identical to the common law public disclosure tort.
34. 498 F. Supp. at 403.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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photographs would be made of the performance.17 The plaintiff's claim
against the magazine alleged that the unauthorized publication of the pho-
tograph violated both section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law 8 and
the common law "right of publicity." 3 9
The trial court, in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment,'"
held that the unauthorized publication did not violate the privacy statute."
Although noting that a celebrity "does not, simply by virtue of his or her
notoriety, lose all rights to privacy,' ' 2 the court stated that "such rights can
be severely circumscribed as a result of an individual's newsworthiness."' 3
More particularly, the court surmised that the
use of a person's name or picture in the context of an event within the
"orbit of public interest afid scrutiny" . . . a category into which most
of the events involving a public figure ... fall, can rarely form the basis
for an actionable claim under section 51."
According to the court,
the fact that the plaintiff, a woman who has occupied the fantasies of
many moviegoers over the years, chose to perform unclad in one of her
films is a matter of great interest to many people. And while such an
event may not appear overly important, the scope of what constitutes a
newsworthy event has been afforded a broad definition and held to
include even matters of "entertainment and amusement, concerning in-
teresting phases of human activity in general." . . . [I]t is not for the
courts to decide what matters are of interest to the general public.'
The court's broad characterization of the newsworthiness defense typifies
the public disclosure tort cases.
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. The Appropriation Tort and the Right of Publicity
The final category of privacy torts possibly applicable to an unauthorized
publication of a non-misleading photograph of a celebrity is the appropri-
37. Id. at 403 n.2.
38. Id. at 404. Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law provides, in pertinent part:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used ... for advertising purposes or
for purposes of trade without ... written consent ... may ... sue and recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use ....
N.Y. Civ. RcuTs LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976).
39. 498 F. Supp. at 404. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
40. 498 F. Supp. at 407.
41. Id. at 406.
42. Id. at 404.
43. Id. at 405.
44. Id. (quoting Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977)).
45. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444,
448, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968)).
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ation of name or likeness tort.4 In some cases the appropriation tort cause
of action compensates the plaintiff for the annoyance and humiliation he
may suffer as a result of the unauthorized publication of his name or
likeness.4 7 In Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc.,4 for example,
the plaintiff, "a woman of taste, ' 49 plainly felt embarrassed 0 by the ap-
pearance of a nude photograph of herself in an "unsavory' '5 magazine. In
appropriation cases involving celebrities, however, the plaintiff's complaint
is more likely to be that he was not compensated for the publication rather
than that he was emotionally injured by it. 2 Courts and commentators,
accordingly, have used the term "right of publicity" to describe a popular
figure's proprietary interest in his name or likeness. 3 This term more ac-
curately reflects the real nature of the celebrity's claim in these cases than
does the term "right of privacy." Typically, the appropriation of a celebrity's
name or likeness involves no invasion of privacy because the person is already
"public" and is thus considered to have "waived '5 4 his right to privacy.5
46. Section 652C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
47. T. Haas, Storehouse of Starlight: The First Amendment Privilege To Use Names and
Likenesses in Commercial Advertising 3 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Indiana Law
Journal; forthcoming in 19 U.C.D. L. Rav. (1986)). Haas states that
[a] person's name and likeness are generally considered intimately associated with
the person himself. He may experience annoyance and humiliation from having
his name or likeness widely publicized even when there is nothing embarrassing
in the presentation.
Id.
48. 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
49. Id. at 403.
50. Id. at 405.
51. Id. at 405 n.9.
52. See Ellis, supra note 28, at 1128-33; see also Ashdown, supra note 4, at 785-86; Prosser,
supra note 18, at 401.
53. See, e.g., Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Uhlaender v. Hendricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D.
Minn. 1970); Nimmer, The Right of Privacy, 19 LAw & CoNTmp. PROs. 203 (1954); Comment,
The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv.
527 (1976).
54. The view that a celebrity has "waived" his right to privacy by entering the public
limelight is, of course, a fictional legal conclusion. A legal waiver is generally defined as the
intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right, or such conduct as warrants an
inference of the relinquishment of such right, BLAcK's LAw DIcTioNARY 1417 (5th ed. 1979),
and it seems rather fanciful to suggest that someone has voluntarily agreed to
publicity about his private life when he accepts a part in a motion picture, [etc.]
... The concept of waiver involved in these cases is that of a constructive waiver-
in other words, it is merely a way of restating the conclusion that public figures
have no right of privacy due to the countervailing and more powerful commands
of the First Amendment.
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 4, at 1587.
55. Ashdown, supra note 4, at 786 n.130.
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A celebrity, because he is accustomed to life in the public eye, may also
suffer embarrassment or humiliation from unwanted publicity less readily
than a private person. 56 The unauthorized publication of a celebrity's name
or likeness does, however, "involve the misappropriation of a pecuniary
interest-the right of a public personality to commercially utilize his fame. ' 57
The United States Supreme Court protected this type of pecuniary interest
in the face of a first amendment claim in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co. 58
B. The Zacchini Case
In Zacchini, the Court considered a right of publicity59 claim brought by
the performer of a "human cannonball" act at a county fair. Objecting to
the unauthorized broadcast of a fifteen-second film-clip of his act on a
television newscast, Zacchini brought an action alleging that the broadcaster
had unlawfully appropriated his professional property. 60 The Court of Ap-
peals of Ohio reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
broadcaster and held that the complaint stated a cause of action for con-
version and for infringement of commonlaw copyright. 6' The court also held
that the first amendment did not privilege the press to broadcast Zacchini's
performance on a news program without compensating him for any resulting
financial injury.62
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's holding that Zac-
chini's claim was cognizable under common law copyright 63 and instead
characterized the action as one involving the right of publicity.64 Although
it concluded that a performer's right of publicity is ordinarily entitled to
legal protection, 65 the court held that the first amendment privileged the
television station to report "matters of legitimate public interest" unless the
"actual intent" of the broadcaster was to appropriate the benefit of the act
for "some non-privileged use" or to "injure" Zacchini. 66 Finding that no
such intent was shown and that the performance was a matter of legitimate
public interest, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. 67
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
59. Id. at 565.
60. Id. at 564.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 228, 351 N.E.2d 454, 457 (1976).
64. Id. at 232, 351 N.E.2d at 460.
65. Id. The court stated that a public performer's "right of exclusive control over the
publicity given to his performances ... is a valuable part of the benefit which may be attained
by his talents and efforts ... [and] is entitled to legal protection." Id.
66. Id. at 244, 351 N.E.2d at 455.
67. Id. at 235-36, 351 N.E.2d at 461-62.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ohio
Supreme Court" and held that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments do
not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without
his consent." 69 The Court, focusing on Zacchini's proprietary interest and
its similarity to the interests protected by patent and copyright laws, reasoned
that
"[the broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act pose[d] a substantial
threat to the economic value of that performance," and that the "same
consideration underlying] the patent and copyright laws" required pro-
tection of petitioner's right to publicity as "an economic incentive for
him to make the investment required to produce a performance of interest
to the public."7
The Court posited that fewer people might wish to pay to see the act in
person if they were able to see it on television and, therefore, that the effect
of the broadcast was similar to preventing Zacchini from charging an ad-
mission fee. 7' The Court also suggested that Zacchini's publicity claim could
be premised on a theory of unjust enrichment. 2
The Court's holding in Zacchini affords celebrities little protection against
the unauthorized publication of their photographs because it applies only
when the publication constitutes an appropriation of an "entire act."'73
Federal copyright law likewise provides celebrities with limited protection
because it applies only to works " 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expres-
sion." 74 A public performer can, of course, secure a copyright for a per-
formance by fixing it in a tangible medium of expression. 7 Frequently,
however, a celebrity is not engaged in a copyrightable performance when he
is photographed by the press. Although neither the right of publicity as
limited by Zacchini nor the federal copyright laws provides celebrities with
a legal mechanism for controlling the dissemination of photographs depicting
them in their day-to-day lives, they do suggest, in part, a rationale for such
a mechanism.
C. Rationale for Extending the Right of Publicity
Extending the right of publicity to cases other than those involving either
purely commercial appropriations or appropriations of "entire acts" would
68. 433 U.S. at 579.
69. Id. at 575. The Court's opinion emphasizes that the broadcaster had appropriated
Zacchini's "entire act." See id. at 564, 570, 575.
70. Ashdown, supra note 4, at 789-90 (quoting Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-76).
11. 433 U.S. at 576.
72. Id.; see infra note 84 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
74. 17 U.S.C. app. 101 (1976) (definition of "fixed").
75. Note, supra note 25, at 1193 n.26.
1986]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
furnish talented performers with additional economic incentives to develop
their abilities, prevent unjust enrichment, promote economic efficiency, and
deter the press from creating unwanted associations for celebrities. As the
Supreme Court explicitly recognized in Zacchini,76 a performer's interest in
controlling the dissemination of his act is a proprietary interest similar to
the interest protected by a copyright. As the Court noted, the primary
purpose of the copyright laws is to benefit the general public by providing
authors and artists with an economic incentive to create;77 the concomitant
benefit to the copyright owner is a "secondary consideration.' '78 A copyright,
in effect, provides the copyright owner with a limited monopoly over the
dissemination of the copyrighted material.7 9 While a copyright by definition
limits the flow of creative works and ideas to the public, this limitation is
considered necessary in order to encourage the production of new creative
expression.80 Similarly, protecting the right of performers to control the
dissemination of photographs of their performances encourages the produc-
tion of new performances.
The Court's "entire act" standard does not adequately protect a public
performer's economic incentive to produce performances that the public
finds appealing. A performer's economic incentive to perform could be
undermined by an unauthorized broadcast of less than his entire act. In
Zacchini, for example, the broadcast of a newsclip beginning with Zacchini
already in flight might have reduced attendance at Zacchini's act just as
much as the broadcast of the clip of the entire act. Furthermore, as Justice
Powell noted in dissent,8' the appropriation in Zacchini may not actually
have been of the entire act. Although the Court purported to limit its holding
to cases involving entire acts, the Court may have in fact protected the right
of publicity in a case involving the appropriation of less than an entire act.
The Court's "entire act" standard, therefore, bears little relationship to the
economic realities of public performances.
The policy underlying the right of publicity-the protection of a public
performer's economic incentive to perform-suggests that the right should
extend to a performer's dally activities as well as to his "acts." For example,
the compensation a famous baseball player can command for endorsing a
product in a television commercial is part of the "reward" he reaps for his
efforts and talents on the baseball field; the compensation corresponds little
76. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
77. Id. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
78. Id. at 577 (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
79. See Note, supra note 25, at 1192 ("a grant of copyright necessarily limits the flow of
ideas by limiting the means by which these ideas can be expressed. Copyright law represents
a compromise between encouraging the production of new artistic expression and giving the
public access to this expression.").
80. Id.
81. 433 U.S. at 579 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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to the ballplayer's acting ability or to the labor he expends in making the
commercial. Indeed, in some cases the public performer's income from
endorsements, public appearances, and other "side" activities may greatly
exceed the compensation he receives from his principal occupation. 2 In such
a case, protecting the public performer's right to be compensated for these
"side" activities encourages him to continue to perform in a way society
finds pleasing so as to maintain his public appeal. More importantly, the
knowledge that the law protects the right of actors and athletes to exploit
their fame commercially beyond the context of movies or sports events will
further encourage others to aspire to become actors and athletes. Extending
the right of publicity to cases involving the unauthorized publication of a
celebrity's photograph would similarly make the "job" of being a public
performer more attractive. By protecting the right of celebrities to com-
mercially exploit their fame generally rather than solely in the context of
performances or commercial endorsements, the law would help maximize
incentive to develop and maintain skills and talents that society finds ap-
pealing.
Equitable considerations and principles of economic efficiency also support
extending the right of publicity. Permitting the media to publish celebrities'
photographs without compensating them enables the media to benefit from
the celebrities' fame at no cost beyond the expense involved in taking and
producing the photograph.83 As the Court noted in Zacchini,
[t]he rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straight-forward
one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social
purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally
pay."
A right to control the dissemination of their photographs would make it
possible for celebrities to secure compensation for the benefits they bestow
on the media and the public,8 5 and would thus foster basic notions of fairness.
Such a right would also promote economic efficiency. Under the law in
its current status, the press is able to produce entertainment by appropriating
the fame of public personalities and then to invoke the protections of the
first amendment in order to avoid paying for the appropriation. 6
82. A famous Olympic swimmer, for example, may never be compensated for swimming
but might earn millions of dollars from endorsements upon retiring from amateur sports.
83. Note, supra note 25, at 1190.
84. 433 U.S. at 576 (quoting Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAw & CoNmmS'. PRORS. 326, 331 (1966)).
85. Note, supra note 25, at 1190.
86. See Ellis, Damages and the Privacy Tort: Sketching a "Legal Profile," 64 IowA L.
REv. 1111, 1140 (1979). Although Ellis's discussion concerns the public disclosure tort and
private individuals rather than the right of publicity and celebrities, his observations are equally
applicable here.
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In economic terms, the press does not internalize the full costs of pro-
duction; instead it imposes external costs on involuntary participants
[celebrities] . .. . This results in a waste of resources and the production
of excessive entertainment by the press. It'is therefore inefficient.
The economic inefficiency and the unfairness that result from the current
state of the law are strong reasons for extending the right of publicity.
Another rationale for extending the right of publicity is rooted in the
belief that it is an "affront to human dignity" to permit others to publish
a person's likeness and thereby establish associations for him. 8 The emotional
harm that can result from having one's photograph appear in a particular
context is evident in Braun v. Flynt.8 9 In Braun, a female entertainer who
performed a novelty act9° in an amusement park brought suit against Chic
Magazine, a "hard-core men's magazine," 9' objecting to the defendant's
unauthorized publication of a photograph of her act. 92 The court, in af-
firming a jury verdict.based on the false-light invasion of privacy tort,93
suggested that "[c]ommon sense dictates that the context and manner in
which a ... picture appears determines to a large extent the effect which
it will have on the person... seeing it." 94 According to the court, the jury
was reasonable in implicitly finding "that the ordinary reader automatically
will form an unfavorable opinion about the character of a woman whose
picture appears in" the defendant's magazine. 95
87. Id.
88. T. Haas, supra note 47, at 4.
89. 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984).
90.
Part of Mrs. Braun's job included working in a novelty act with "Ralph the
Diving Pig." In the act, Mrs. Braun, treading water in a pool, would hold out
a bottle of milk with a nipple on it. Ralph would dive into the pool and feed
from the bottle.
Id. at 247.
91. Id.
92. Mrs. Braun had signed a release authorizing the amusement park to use photographs
of her act provided that they be in good taste and not embarrass her or her family. Id. The
defendant had obtained the park's consent to publish the photograph but had done so by
fraudulently misrepresenting the nature of its magazine. See id. at 255. According to the court,
the amusement park "gave fraudulently induced consent, which is the legal equivalent of no
consent." Id.
93. Id. at 252-53. The false-light tort is briefly discussed supra note 20.
94. 726 F.2d at 254.
95. Id. In responding to the defendant's argument "that no ordinary reader would assume
Mrs. Braun to be unchaste or promiscuous on the basis of its publication of her picture," the
court posited:
Even if this were true, the jury might have found that the publication implied
Mrs. Braun's approval of the opinions expressed in Chic or that it implied Mrs.
Braun had consented to having her picture in Chic. Either of these findings would
support the jury verdict that the publication placed Mrs. Braun in a false light
highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Id. at n.ll.
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III. DEFINING THE BROADER PROTECTION
The rights of privacy and publicity, as well as the copyright laws, provide
celebrities with a measure of protection against the unauthorized publication
of their photographs. Unless one of these well-established legal principles is
directly applicable, however, celebrities are unable to recover from the media
for the unauthorized publication of their photographs. Protected by the
newsworthiness defense, the media is frequently able to exploit freely the
fame of public personalities; celebrities, in effect, are forced to contribute
various aspects of their private and commercial lives to the public domain
because of the public's interest 96 in them. The press has increasingly been
criticized for its intrusive and exploitative tendencies. 97 Courts should expand
the protection currently available to celebrities against this invasiveness by
extending the well-established intrusion and publicity torts.
As noted earlier, 98 movie stars, professional athletes, and other public
performers, because of the "public" nature of their occupations, are typically
considered to have "waived" their right to privacy; they are also probably
more psychologically tolerant of having their daily lives depicted in the
press.9 While the private lives of popular figures are therefore rightfully
accorded little protection, it does not follow that the press should have the
unfettered ability to capitalize on a celebrity's fame. Fame, whether it be
acquired by luck, talent, or effort, is capable of being exploited for economic
gain. The unauthorized publication of a celebrity's likeness may "involve
the misappropriation of a pecuniary interest-the right of a public personality
to commercially utilize his fame. ' ' '°° Courts, therefore, should focus on
whether the press has appropriated something with potential proprietary
value when assessing the celebrity's interest in a case involving the unau-
thorized publication of his photograph.
The conclusion that in certain circumstances a celebrity has a proprietary
interest in his likeness is a legal conclusion.' 0' A celebrity will have ownership
rights in his likeness only to the extent that he can legally enforce such
rights. "[A] person's appearance is in the usual course, of social interaction
a beneficial externality"' 0 2 that anyone may freely enjoy. The law could, of
96. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Smith, Let's Spare Charles And Diana The Cheap Shots, TV GurDE, Nov.
9-15, 1985, at 34; Miller, supra note 25.
98. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
100. Ashdown, supra note 4, at 786 n.130.
101. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953), for example, the court noted that it is "immaterial" whether the right to grant the
exclusive privilege of publishing one's picture is labelled a property right: "the tag 'property'
simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth." Id. at 868.
102. Haas, supra note 47, at 3.
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course, say that no one may publish a celebrity's photograph without his
consent in any circumstances; such a position, however, would violate the
first amendment0 3 and would be highly difficult to enforce. A celebrity's
ability to capitalize economically on his appearance depends on his ability
to restrict the public's access to it. In determining whether a celebrity should
be permitted to recover damages for the unauthorized publication of his
photograph, a court should consider not only the public policies outlined
earlier but also whether it would be practical to restrict the public's access
to the celebrity's likeness under the facts of the particular case.
The tort of intrusion is intended to compensate a person for the emotional
distress that occurs when some private place or seclusion is intentionally
intruded upon by the defendant.1°4 Although the intrusion tort may have
the effect of protecting the individual's interest in keeping certain private
or embarrassing facts or activities from public view, it does so indirectly by
protecting the distinct interest in security. 0 In other words, the tort, by
protecting a certain place, permits the individual to throw "about his person
or affairs" a "private seclusion."'0 Celebrities should be able to recover
damages from the press when it publishes photographs obtained by invading,
either physically or by mechanical device, an area that should be legally
protected from public view. Although the decision whether the press has
invaded an area that should receive such protection will necessarily depend
on the facts of the particular case, a few basic guidelines may inform the
decision.
No intrusion into a private place occurs, of course, when a celebrity is
photographed on a public street or in some other "public" place such as a
park or courthouse. In public places such as these the press, like everyone
else, may freely photograph celebrities and not be subject to liability. The
press should also not be liable for the publication of photographs obtained
in these circumstances unless one of the privacy torts or the publicity tort
directly applies.
A celebrity should be accorded the greatest protection from intrusion by
the press when in his house, apartment, or other living quarters. The press
generally cannot physically trespass upon private property in order to pho-
tograph a celebrity,107 and neither should it be permitted to "intrude" into
a celebrity's home through the use of a telephoto lens or other mechanical
device.' 01 Celebrities should be expected to take reasonable steps to keep out
103. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
105. See Ellis, supra note 86, at 1146.
106. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652B comment c (1977).
107. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment b (1977); Ellis, supra note 86,
at 1148.
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the unwanted eye of the press, such as closing curtains on windows or
building privacy fences around swimming pools;' °9 a celebrity's recourse to
such forms of "self-help," however, may not always be sufficient to meet
the press's ingenuity. The press, when it publishes photographs obtained by
intruding into a celebrity's home or other private place, should be liable to
the celebrity for unjust enrichment.
Cases falling in between the extreme cases of a public street or private
home are more difficult to decide. Whether a celebrity should be able to
recover damages for the unauthorized publication of photographs obtained
at semi-secluded places such as a restaurant or exclusive resort area should
be decided with reference to whether the celebrity had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the place. While deciding whether a person had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a given place may be difficult, courts
are frequently called upon to make the same determination in cases involving
fourth amendment challenges to police searches and seizures."10 The inquiry
should be a common-sense one and should take into account the fact that
celebrities attract and expect greater attention from the press than do private
individuals; a celebrity's expectation of privacy will be objectively and sub-
jectively reasonable in fewer instances than for the private individual. A
movie star, for example, should fully expect to be photographed at a public
restaurant, but may reasonably expect not to be photographed while sun-
bathing on a beach at a privately owned island. Again, the inquiry must be
guided by the facts of the particular case.
The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy principle would primarily apply to
cases involving photographs of the day-to-day activities of the celebrity.
When a celebrity is photographed while engaged in some performance, the
determining factors for deciding whether the publisher should be liable to
the celebrity should be the extent to which public access to the performance
was limited and whether the celebrity was compensated for the performance.
When a celebrity is paid for a performance and the public must pay to see
it, the act is clearly being "marketed." It may be that in such a case the
publication of photographs from the act might provide a type of free ad-
vertising and actually increase attendance and the celebrity's compensation.
But the celebrity should be permitted to decide for himself whether pho-
tographs of the act should be published and, if so, by whom. He should,
for example, be permitted to grant a broadcaster the exclusive right to
broadcast his performance in exchange for certain compensation. Although
the exposure might reduce attendance at the performance, the money received
from the broadcaster might result in greater overall profits for the per-
former."' When a celebrity's act is in some manner being marketed, the
109. Ellis, supra note 86, at 1148.
110. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Ill. Note, supra note 25, at 1197.
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media should not be able to appropriate that act without compensating the
celebrity for it.
IV. TIE BROADER PROTECTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
While a wide variety of theories have been advanced concerning the values
and functions of the free speech and press guarantees" 2 of the first amend-
ment, ' 3 three themes have perhaps been most prevalent. The most commonly
accepted view is that freedom of expression is important primarily as a
means toward democratic self-government." 4 A related though somewhat
broader view emphasizes the role that free expression plays in the search
for "knowledge" and "truth" in the "marketplace of ideas.""' 5 The third
and most expansive theme is that free expression is important not as a means
to an end but rather as an integral part of freedom itself; the purpose of
the first amendment, according to this view, is to promote self-expression
and self-realization," 6 essential aspects of individuality and autonomy. The
broader protection for celebrities vis-A-vis the press advocated by this Note
does not conflict with the first amendment under the first two views but
cannot be justified under the third.
The view that the first amendment is intended primarily to promote in-
dividual self-expression and self-realization is boundless and cannot be har-
monized with several Supreme Court cases. For example, the publication of
obscene materials may be an expression of the publisher's world view or
conception of beauty, but such publication can constitutionally be pros-
cribed." 7 Similarly, when a person directs racial slurs at someone in an
attempt to provoke a fight, the speaker may be expressing the combative
112. This Note uses the terms "free speech" and "free press" synonymously. The terms are
used interchangeably with the term "free expression."
113. See F. HAMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FRE SOC=TY 5 (1981) (there is a "lack of
consensus in our society concerning the basis [sic] purposes and values underlying the First
Amendment").
114. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.");
see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("Thus we consider this
case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials.").
115. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market .... ").
116. See F. HAn&AN, supra note 13, at 6 ("The self-expression and self-fulfillment of the
individuals who compose a society are ends in themselves.").
117. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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nature of his personality; "fighting words," however, are not protected by
the first amendment."' Thus, while the unauthorized publication of a ce-
lebrity's photograph may be an expression of the publisher's infatuation
with fame or famous persons, this fact alone should not insulate the publisher
from liability.
The notion that the right of free expression serves primarily to foster the
process of democratic self-government was first persuasively advanced by
Alexander Meiklejohn." 9 Meiklejohn drew a fundamental distinction between
"public" speech-"speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues
with which voters have to deal"120-and "private" speech-speech "directed
toward our private interests, private privileges, private possessions."''2 For
Meiklejohn,
[tihe principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of
the program of self-government .... It is a deduction from the basic
American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suf-
frage.12
2
The first amendment under the Meiklejohn thesis protects only public
speech, but the protection is absolute.'1 Private speech, on the other hand,
is entitled only to the protection of "due process" and subject "to such
abridgements as the general welfare may require."' 24
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted Meiklejohn's
view that speech related to the process of self-government warrants greater
protection than private expression, that view is clearly reflected in the Court's
line of libel cases beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'21 In
New York Times, the Court created constitutional safeguards for the right
to criticize the official conduct of public officials. 126 The Court's opinion
emphasized the "profound national commitment.. .that debate on public
118. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
119. See also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971).
120. A. MEiKLEXOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERMENT 94 (1948).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 26-27.
123. See, e.g., id. at 65-66 ("Shall we give a hearing to those who hate and despise freedom,
to those who, if they had the power, would destroy our institutions? Certainly, yes! Our action
must be guided, not by their principles, but by ours. We listen, not because they desire to
speak, but because we need to hear.").
124. Id. at 94-95.
125. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
126. The Court held that:
[t]he constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.
Id. at 279-80.
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issues should be uninhibited,"'' 27 and suggested that "criticism of govern-
mental conduct"' 2 lies "at the very center of the constitutionally protected
area of free expression.' 29
Three years after New York Times, the Court decided that the "actual
malice" standard should apply to libel actions brought by "public figures"
as well as by "public officials."' 130 The Court's attempts to define and apply
the "public figure" category in subsequent cases, however, evince a policy
of limiting the constitutional protections of New York Times to speech with
potential political significance.' 3' For example, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 132 the Court found that the plaintiff was not a public figure even though
he had "long been active in community and professional affairs" and was
"well-known in some circles.' 1 33 Justice Powell's majority opinion empha-
sized that the plaintiff "had achieved no general fame or notoriety in the
community." '34 The Court concluded that "[a]bsent ... general fame or
notoriety,'in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of
society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all
aspects of his life.' ' 3
The narrowness of the "public figure" category was made even clearer
in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,3 6 decided in 1976. In Firestone, the defendant
had published in Time magazine an article describing the divorce proceeding
between an heir to the Firestone tire fortune and his wife. 137 The article
falsely reported that a divorce had been granted on grounds of extreme
cruelty and adultery. 3 The Court, in reviewing a $100,000 defamation
judgment for Mrs. Firestone against the publisher, held that Mrs. Firestone
was not a public figure for the purpose of determining the first amendment
protection afforded the article. 139 In determining that the plaintiff was not
a public figure, the Court emphasized that public figure status derives pri-
marily from the individual's influence on public issues. In spite of the fact
that Mrs. Firestone was " 'prominent among ... Palm Beach society,' and
an 'active [member] of the sporting set' . . . whose activities predictably
attracted the attention of a sizeable portion of the public,"' 4 she was not
127. Id. at 270.
128. Id. at 291.
129. Id. at 292.
130. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
131. Ashdown, supra note 4, at 772.
132. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
133. Id. at 351-52.
134. Id. at 352-53.
135. Id. at 352.
136. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
137. See id. at 451-52.
138. Id. at 452.
139. Id. at 453-55.
140. Id. at 484-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d
745, 751 (Fla. 1972)).
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a public figure as defined in Gertz. She had not "assume[d] any role of
especial prominence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach
society, and she [had] not thrust herself into the forefront of any particular
public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved
in it.' ' 4' Mrs. Firestone, then, could recover damages without proving actual
malice.
The Court, in limiting the protections of New York Times to cases in-
volving public officials and public figures who have "thrust" themselves
into public controversies, 42 has in effect drawn the distinction between public
speech and private speech advocated by Meiklejohn.' 43 Speech directed at
prominent individuals who have injected themselves into public controversies
is given greater protection against libel judgments than speech concerning
private persons. Public officials, through their involvement in government,
and public figures, through their influence on public opinion,'" have a
significant impact on the political process. The press, in order to fulfill its
function of informing the public on matters that are affected by the political
process, must be safeguarded from the inhibiting influence of libel actions
brought by the individuals who have the greatest sway in that process.
Under the Meiklejohn view, the first amendment generally would not be
implicated by the publication of a celebrity's photograph, since rarely will
a celebrity be photographed in connection with a political event or issue.
The picture in Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 14S for example,
had no political significance and would not have been protected by the first
amendment under this view. However, a celebrity's ability to recover damages
from the press for the unauthorized publication of a photograph would be
severely circumscribed by the first amendment if the photograph depicted
the celebrity in connection with a political event or issue. For example, the
press would have a broad privilege to publish a photograph of a popular
singer's performance at a concert benefitting farmers since the plight of
farmers is a highly politically charged issue.' 6 But in the more typical case
involving a photograph depicting a celebrity in his day-to-day activities or
while engaged in a performance having no political significance, the first
amendment would not privilege the publication.
Although the Supreme Court has on several occasions recognized the
crucial role that free expression plays in our system of self-government, 47
141. 424 U.S. at 453.
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
144.. The recent concerts benefitting the starving in Africa and American farmers are examples.
145. 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). For a discussion of the Ann-Margret case, see supra
notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
146. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1985, at A16, col. 1.
147. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) ("The First Amendment affords the
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the Court has never suggested that the first amendment protects only political
speech. Many of the Court's opinions make clear that the expression of all
kinds of ideas-social, esthetic, moral, as well as political-falls within the
purview of the first amendment.' 4 The Court and commentators have fre-
quently invoked the metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas" when advancing
the view that the first amendment's chief function is to foster the search
for "truth" and "knowledge" through discourse.' 49 As with the Meiklejohn
thesis, the primary benefits of the marketplace of ideas theory inure to the
audience rather than to the speaker.'50 The major difference between the
two theories is in their scope: the marketplace of ideas view, for example,
protects many forms of entertainment-those that embody an idea-while
the Meiklejohn thesis does not.' 5'
The Supreme Court has made it clear that entertainment is protected by
the first amendment.' 52 The protection accorded entertainment may stem, in
part, from a hesitation on the part of courts to make subtle distinctions
between works that have some informative value, such as a news story, and
works that merely entertain.' 53 A stronger justification for protecting enter-
tainment is that entertaining works frequently embody or evoke "ideas"
broadest protection to such political expression. . . ."); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (" 'the essence of self-government' ") (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("a major purpose of
[the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs"); Herbert
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 184 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) ("the First Amendment serves to
foster the values of democratic self-government").
148. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 390 (first amendment protects the
"right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences"); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("guarantees for speech
and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential
as those are to healthy government"); United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) ("First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly
only to the extent it can be characterized as political. . . . 'free speech and a free press are
not confined to any field of human interest.' ") (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
531 (1945)).
149. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 390 ("It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail .... "); M. NIOMMR, NUAMER ON FREEDOM OF SrancH 102[A]-[E] (1984). Nimmer defends
the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor. Id. He suggests that the "enlightenment function" is
the primary function of the first amendment and emphasizes the basic point that "[t]he search
for all forms of 'truth,' which is to say the search for all aspects of knowledge and the
formulation of enlightened opinion on all subjects is dependent upon open channels of com-
munication." Id. at 102[A].
150. See M. NMER, supra note 149, at 1.02[F].
151. Under the Meiklejohn thesis, entertainment, like all "private speech," is entitled only
to the protection of "due process." See supra note 124.
152. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1978)
("There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection.").
153. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 388 (" 'The line between the informing and
the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of . [freedom of the press].' ") (quoting
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72).
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that belong in the "marketplace." A work of fiction may stimulate intel-
lectual thought as much as a great political treatise. Some forms of enter-
tainment, however, such as a belly dance or sports event, are essentially
non-intellectual in character; publications consisting of celebrities' photo-
graphs will typically be of this type. Such works warrant less first amendment
protection because they do not contribute to the marketplace of ideas.
Publications involving celebrities' photographs may be placed on a rough
continuum with respect to the degree that they contribute to the marketplace
of ideas. 54 At one end of the continuum are unauthorized publications that
are intended solely to create or sell a product and which have little or no
informative value. 5 A poster of a movie star or famous athlete is a good
example; the unauthorized use of a renowned inventor's likeness on medicine
bottles is another.5 6 Because these types of publications have little informative
value and seek solely to exploit the public appeal of the individual for
economic gain, they have generally been considered to fall outside the pro-
tection of the first amendment.'" Celebrities, therefore, have frequently been
permitted to recover the fair market value of their likenesses in these purely
commercial settings. 5
At the other end of the continuum lie publications which are primarily
intended to convey information about some aspect or event in the celebrity's
life. 59 These types of publications, in turn, can be grouped into those which
present information with socio-political significance and those with no such
significance.' Examples of the former would include photographs of ce-
lebrities protesting apartheid at the South African Embassy; 6' a photograph
of a famous movie actor and actress walking arm-in-arm is an example of
the latter. Publications which present information with socio-political sig-
nificance warrant the fullest first amendment protection since they contribute
to debate on issues of the day. 62 Unauthorized publications of photographs
conveying no information of socio-political importance implicate less sig-
nificant first amendment interests; such publications provide "little in the
154. See FeIcher & Rubin, supra note 4, at 1601-08.
155. Id. at 1606.
156. Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (Ch. 1907).
157. See FeIcher & Rubin, supra note 4, at 1606.
158. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Products, Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 143, 296 S.E.2d. 697, 703 (1982) ("the measure of damages to a
public figure for violation of his or her right of publicity is the value of the appropriation to
the user"); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (famous actor
entitled "to recover the fair market value of the use for the purposes of trade of his face,
name and reputation").
159. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 4, at 1602.
160. Id.
161. See N.Y. Times, July 10, 1985, at B6, col. 4.
162. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 4, at 1602; see also supra notes 114 & 146 and
accompanying text.
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way of provocation of thought, . . . [have] scant relationship to the mar-
ketplace of ideas and minimal bearing on the conduct of the polity,"' 63 and
are essentially exploitative in nature. In this context, the first amendment
should not bar celebrities from recovering compensation from the press for
the unauthorized publication of their photographs.
Lying at the center of the continuum are publications whose primary
purpose is to entertain.' 64 As with information-oriented publications, enter-
tainment-oriented publications can be roughly grouped into those which
embody some socially useful characteristic and those which merely exploit
the fame or other attributes of the public personality. 65 The primary char-
acteristic that distinguishes the two groups is the presence or absence of
some "creative effort."'1 For example, an unauthorized photograph pub-
lished in a biography of a celebrity can be seen as part of the biographer's
overall creative effort to "capture" the essence of his subject's life. On the
other hand, a photograph published in a magazine and unaccompanied by
exposition or presented with a small amount of primarily factual information
will less likely be the product of significant creative effort.
[A] work that merely capitalizes on the attributes of another, without
contributing anything substantially unique or new, is likely to be subject
to liability. In works of the latter type, nothing is added to our cultural
experience; consequently, the First Amendment protection generally pro-
vided for creative works is not available. 67
In accordance with the guidelines outlined in section III, the press should
be subject to liability when it publishes, without authorization, photographs
of celebrities in a manner that manifests no real creative effort.
CONCLUSION
Courts should extend the right of publicity and the tort of intrusion to
provide celebrities with broader protections against the unauthorized pub-
lication of their photographs. Extending the right of publicity would furnish
163. Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal Regulation of Public Com-
munication, 46 TEx. L. REv. 650, 659 (1968).
164. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 4, at 1604.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1604-05.
The distinction between imitation and parody is based on the same principle.
Imitation is primarily an attempt to duplicate the characteristics of another, either
to delude the public or to compensate for an absence of creative effort. Parody,
on the other hand, makes use of another's attributes as part of a larger pres-
entation, in which a considerable amount of content is provided by the parodist.
For this reason, imitation is generally actionable, while parody tends to be pro-
tected.
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talented performers with additional economic incentives to develop their
abilities, prevent unjust enrichment, promote economic efficiency, and deter
the press from creating unwanted associations for celebrities. Extending the
tort of intrusion to cases where the celebrity has a reasonable expectation
of privacy would enable celebrities to enjoy more fully the amenities of their
homes and other secluded places without fearing the intrusive eye of the
press. Broadening these well-established remedies would not impinge on
significant first amendment principles because the publication of photographs
of celebrities rarely contributes to the marketplace of ideas.
D. ScoTT GuRNEY

